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The Constitutional Duty of
Teachers to Protect Students:
Employing the "Sufficient
Custody" Test
We are poignantly aware of the seeming transformation of our
public schools from institutions of learning into crucibles of disaffection
marred by increasing violence from which anguish and despair are often
brought to homes across the nation.'
INTRODUCTION
At 8:00 am., Mrs. Mary Jones brings her fourteen-year-old son Jeff
to school Although Mrs. Jones knows that it is a dangerous world out
there, she is confident about leaving her son in the hands of the
competent teachers at the local high schooL
Also at 8:00 am., Mrs. Sandy Smith, the high school's history
teacher, walks down the hallway to her first class. As she passes the
locker of Stanley Jordan, a linebacker on the school football team, she
notices him placing a small firearm on the top shelf of his locker. Mrs.
Smith, who is only five feet tall, decides she is not paid enough to put
her life on the line by approaching Stanley. She feels her best course of
action is to inform the principal or a security officer. However, before she
can make it to the principal's office, several other small problems arise
and by the time she walks into her 8:30 am. class, Mrs. Smith has
forgotten about Stanley and his firearm.
At 10:30 am., both Jeff Jones and Stanley Jordan walk into Mrs.
Smith's history class. On their way through the door, Jeff accidentally
bumps Stanley. Stanley, having "borrowed" his father's gun for the day,
decides to put a scare into Jeff. Unfortunately, Jeff does not scare as
easily as perhaps he should, and Stanley feels compelled to back up his
threat. At 12:30 p.m., Mrs. Jones finds out that Jeff has died of a gunshot
wound he received while at school.
Although Stanley is likely criminally liable, is Mrs. Smith in any way
liable as well? As an ordinary citizen, she has no affirmative duty to
' Caham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991, 992 (10th Cir. 1994).
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protect a third person.2 Does she have a duty as a teacher? What level
of protection should Mrs. Jones have been able to expect the local school
to provide to her son and other students?
The above example is meant to show the two sides of holding a
teacher constitutionally liable for injury to students caused by third
persons. On one hand, parents expect a certain degree of protection for
their children when they are at school Although they cannot reasonably
expect teachers to insure the safety of their children, they do expect
teachers to act responsibly to prevent dangerous situations when they
have the power and opportunity to do so.
On the other hand, how much should teachers have to endure?
Teachers are paid comparatively little for a job that is arguably the one
most responsible for shaping our nation--a job that is already made
difficult by student apathy and parental meddling. The addition of a
constitutional duty to protect students from any type of foreseeable
danger in schools, when schools get more dangerous every day, is a
tremendous burden to place on them.
This Note treats the issue of whether teachers should have a
constitutional duty to protect children, while at school, from third
parties.4 If the courts decide that this duty exists, then teachers could be
2 See Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 811 (N.H. 1898) ("The duty to do no
wrong is a legal duty. The duty to protect against wrong is, generally speaking, and
excepting certain intimate relations in the nature of a trust, a moral obligation only, not
recognized or enforced by law."), partially overruled by Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d
631, 634 (N.H. 1976) (holding that "owners and occupiers of lind shall be governed by
the test of reasonable care ... in the maintenance and operation of their property').
See, e.g., Mike Dunne, Srvey: Teachers Like Profession, But Low Morale &Hill
a Big Problem, ADvoc., Aug. 15, 1994, at Al ("In addition to low pay, many teachers
complained about lack of appreciation for their role in society."); Connie C. Sexton,
Teachers' Rally Aims at Ending Wage Freeze, ARIZ. REPUBLICIPHOMI GAZMrE Sept.
14, 1994; (Northwest Phoenix Community), at 3 (discussing the attempt of 500 teachers
to convince school board members to grant pay raises); Terrence Stutz, Lone &tar
Teachers Losing Heart; Poll Shows Many Leave Citing Work Conditions, DALAS
MORNING NsWs, Sept. 18, 1994, at Al ("The main source of [dissatisfaction] is not the
low salary that many teachers say they receive .... Nearly 44 percent ... cited worlng
conditions as the reason.").
' Schoolchildren are subject to harm from dangers present at school which are not
human as well as from those presented by other students; for the sake of simplicity,
however, this Note uses the term "third parties" to refer to both these human and non-
human dangers. It should be noted, however, that this Note does not cover the related
topic of liability of the school board or administration for the intentional actions of the
teacher (e.g., sexual harassment of the student by the teacher). Although some similar
elements exist, the liability of administration for the acts of a teacher involves some
divergent elements concerning proof of knowledge and training. For a good treatment of
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sued under federal laws for recovery by children who are injured while
in their care.'
The circuit courts apply a bright-line test to determine the imposition
of liability;, however, the circuits are split regarding the proper applica-
tion of the test.7 This Note argues that the courts should not limit
themselves to a bright-line analysis but should look at the individual
situation of the student to determine liability. The test proposed by this
Note is the "sufficient custody" test.8
Part I of this Note focuses on the historical basis of 42 U.S.C. §
1983" torts as a means of imposing liability when a constitutional duty
to protect is found. Such a duty usually arises through the finding of a
special relationship involving the state's custody of the citizen.'0 Part II
focuses on the rationale for the imposition of a constitutional duty in
situations where custody does not exist." Part III then examines how
this subject, see Gail P. Sorenson, School District Liability for Federal CMl Rights
Violations Under Section 1983, 76 Educ. L. Rep. 313 (West) (Oct. 8, 1992) (concluding
that liability should arise "once duty, cause and custom (or policy) are shown" and that
the government, not the individual, should bear the loss).
s This Note deals only with the narrow issue of a teacher's constitutional duty to
protect children. Even when no constitutional liability attaches, a teacher may still be
terminated, and state remedies may still be available. For a discussion of common law
duties of teachers, see Donald H. Henderson et al, The Use of Exculpatory Clauses and
Consent Forns By Edtcational Institutions, 67 Educ. L. Rep. 13 (West) (June 20, 1991)
(concluding that a subjective standard must be applied when deciding whether
"exculpatory agreements or consent forms" give rise to express or implied assumption of
the risk).
6 When detemining the issue of custody in an ordinary school setting, courts make
a judgment about schools in general without looking at the situation in the particular case
before them.
7 In applyig the brigbt-line test, courts have come to differing conclusions as to whether
an ordinary school setting presents enough custody to warrant the imposition of a duty on
teachers to protect students from third parties. The Fifth Circuit appears to favor imposing this
duty. See Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994); Walton v. Alexander,
20 F.3d 1350, rehk, en banc, granted, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 16495 (5th Cir. 1994); see also
infra notes 107-43 and accompanying text. However, several circuits have refused to impose
this duty. See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (Sth Cir. 1993); Maldonado
v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993); D.R. v. Middle
Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct.
1045 (1993); see also inhra notes 68-90 and accompanying text (discussing Dorothy J, Middle
Bucks, and Maldonado).
This test will be fully explained infra in part IV.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
"o See infra notes 14-41 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
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courts have applied this rationale specifically to the school environ-
ment." Part IV presents this Note's proposal for the "sufficient custody"
test.
13
IL LIABILITY OF STATE ACTORS FOR VIOLATION
OF DuE PROCESS IN § 1983 ACTIONS
The constitutional duty placed on the teaching profession is based
upon the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 This amendment only prevents a
state actor from violating a person's due process rights and does not
generally create a duty for a state actor to protect the public. 5 However,
if a "special relationship" exists between the victim and the state, then
that relationship creates a corresponding obligation for protection."6
Therefore, if courts rule that a teacher has a special relationship with his
or her students,17 then the teacher can be constitutionally liable if a
student's due process rights are harmed in any way. Section 1983
provides the student with the right to sue the teacher for this type of
harnt'. The federal tort claim gives students an avenue of recovery
when state laws still provide immunity for state actors. 9
', See infra notes 56-197 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 198-247 and accompanying text.
4 The pertinent part of this amendment states: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
" "The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security." DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
6 "It is true that in certain limited circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the
State affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular individuals." Id.
at 198.
"' A"special relationship" in this context would be created by custody of the student
This notion is discussed at length within this Note. See infra notes 65-173 and
accompanying text.
" According to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (codifying the Civil Rights Act of 1871):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
See, e.g., Ralph D. Mawdsley, Compensation for the Sexually Abused Student, 84
Educ. L. Rep. 13 (West) (Sept. 23, 1993) (detailing the difficulties students face in trying
to obtain a recovery).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has dealt with § 1983 torts ° in a variety
of contexts2 Three decisions directly relate to the issue of a state actor's
duty to protect a citizen. The first two, Estelle v. Gamble2 and Young-
berg v. Romeo, dealt with the issue of what duties the state has in
relation to incarcerated or involuntarily committed persons. In Estelle, the
Court stated that, due to incarceration, prisoners could not care for
themselvesO Therefore, the state has a duty to provide adequate medical
care.' The Court in Youngberg furthered this reasoning by applying it
to involuntarily committed mental patients2 Although the Youngberg
Court found that the state has an affirmative duty to protect involuntarily
committed mental patients under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court also realized that "[i]f it is cruel and
unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it
must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who may
not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions."27 Thus, the Court found an
affirmative duty to protect a citizen who is placed fully within the state's
custody.
The U.S. Supreme Court then applied the Estelle-Youngberg rulings
to a situation where custody was unclear. In the case of DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,8 the Department of
Social Services ("D.S.S.") had been alerted to the possibility that Joshua
DeShaney was being abused by his father.' Over a two-year period, a
D.S.S. caseworker compiled a case file containing three instances of
abuse reported by treating physicians and her personal observations of
Commentator Gail Sorenson notes that claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are
often labeled as "constitutional torts." Sorenson, however, shies away from the term
"constitutional torV' since the commentator does not want to belie the importance of §
1983 in these cases. Thus, Sorenson argues that these suits should be called "section 1983
torts." Sorenson, supra note 4. Since the author has no reason to dispute these findings,
this Note refers to these torts as § 1983 torts.
2 For a good treatment of the history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Susan B. Shoemaker,
D.T. v. Independent School District: Limiting Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 24 UB.
LAW. 393 (1992) and Sorenson, supra note 4.
2 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (determining whether the state has an affirmative duty to
protect prisoners).
23 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (determining whether the state has an affirmative duty to
protect involuntarily committed mental patients).
24 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04.
2 Id.
26 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22.
27 Id. at 315-16.
28 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
2' Id. at 192-93.
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indications of abuse.3 Although at one point the state temporarily took
Joshua into custody, he continued to reside permanently at home, with the
caseworker making periodic visits.3 About six months after Joshua's last
visit to the emergency room, his father beat him so severely that he fell
into a life-threatening coma.' Joshua's mother, who did not live with
Joshua and his father, then filed an action under § 1983; she claimed that
the D.S.S. deprived Joshua of his liberty without due process of law by
not protecting him from his father.
33
Initially, the DeShaney Court reiterated its basic position that the Due
Process Clause generally does not create a duty for the state to act
affirmatively to protect its citizens and that the Clause was enacted only
to limit the state's power to act.? The Court then looked at this issue in
light of the Estelle-Youngberg reasoning. In those cases, the Court had
found that the state had an affirmative duty to act for its citizens'
protection.35 However, the Court decided Estelle and Youngberg based
on a special relationship between the victim and the state created by
complete control. 'Taken together, they [Estelle and Youngberg] stand
only for the proposition that when the State takes a person into its
custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes
upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety
and general well-being."3
In DeShaney, however, Joshua had not been taken into custody,37
nor was the state, through the D.S.S., in control of Joshua's personal
freedom. To the Court, the issue of control dominated over the issue of
whether the state was aware of the danger Joshua faced. "The affirmative
duty to protect [arose] not from the State's knowledge of the individual's
predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the
limitation which it ha[d] imposed on his freedom to act on his own
30 Id.
31 Id. at 192.
32 Id. at 193.
33 Id.
3 Id. at 195-96 (noting that the Due Process Clause 's phrased as a limitation on
the State's power to act not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and
security').
31 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
37 Although Joshua had been temporarily taken into custody, this temporary situation
was not enough for the Court to impose liability. "That the State once took temporary
custody of Joshua does not alter the analysis, for when it returned him to his father's
custody, it placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had
it not acted at all... '."Id. at 201.
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behalf." Therefore, even though it seemed obvious that Joshua was in
danger and the D.S.S. had in fact taken some positive steps to safeguard
him, the D.S.S. had no duty to protect Joshua from harm unless it had
taken him into custody. 39 Since the Court found no custody, the D.S.S.
prevailede4
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the state control in
Joshua's situation did not rise to the level of custody, the Court did not
use language that would limit these suits to the Estelle-Youngberg context
only.4 ' Therefore, courts were left open to determine if custody exists
in other situations. One of the most intriguing situations involves
determining whether a custodial relationship exists between teachers and
schoolchildren.
IL RATIONALE FOR THE IMPOSITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LiABmriy FOR STATE ACTORs, ESPECIALLY TEACHERS42
It appears that the situation for schoolchildren lies somewhere
between Estelle-Youngberg (incarceration and institutionalization), and
DeShaney (no custody by the state). In most states, statutory law requires
children to attend school43 Also, while children are in school, teachers
generally acquire "in loco parentis" control." Both of these factors
"Id. at 200.
" Id. at 201 & n.9 (stating that if Joshua had been placed in a foster care home, the
situation would likely move more towards incarceration or institutionalization).
o Id. at 202. The Court rejected petitioners' argument that a "special relationsi"
existed between Joshua and the state "because the State knew that Joshua faced a special
danger of abuse at his father's hands." Id. at 197.
41 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
" Teachers are used here since they are representative and provide readily
identifiable examples. The reader should be aware, however, that school officials such as
princpals may also be held liable under the same theories as teachers.
For example, if a student were injured in a teacher's classroom, the teacher would
be liable if the constitutional duty applied. Likewise, the principal could be held liable if
the requisite gross negligence could be proved on his or her part.
'3 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.010(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1992) ("[E]ach
parent ... having in custody ... any child between the ages of six (6) and sixteen (16)
shall send the child to a regular public day school for the full term that the public school
of the district in which the child resides is in session ....).
' "'Loco parentis' exists when person undertakes care and control of another in
absence of such supervision by latter's natural parents and in absence of formal legal
approval, and is temporary in character and is not to be hened to an adoption which is
permanent" BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Griego v. Hogan, 377
P.2d 953, 955 (N.M. 1963)); see also Conley v. Board of Educ., 123 A.2d 747, 752
(Conn. 1956) ("It has long been a Connecticut concept that the teacher is in loco
1994-951
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indicate a form of control which could be determined to create a custodial
situation.
However, unlike prisoners or involuntarily committed mental patients,
children are not primarily controlled by the state, since parents still retain
principal control of their children. A child can be removed from school by the
parent at any time, and the child still spends a minority of his or her time at
school. 'Though attendance may not always be voluntary, the public school
remains an open institution. Except perhaps when very young, the child is not
physically restrained from leaving school during school hours; and at the end
of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home."4 Despite this
language and the fact that the DeShaney Court seemed to rule that a violation
could occur only when there is incarceration or institutionalization,4 courts
have been able to find language in DeShaney which may support an
airmative duty for teachers arising out of a "custodial" situation.
The first area discussed by lower courts when interpreting DeShaney is
whether the decision actually prohibits the finding of custody outside of the
prison or mental ward. The U.S. Supreme Court does not seem to adhere to
a hard-line stance. "In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State
affirmative act of restraining the individualN freedom to act on his own
behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of
personal liberty-which is the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections
of the Due Process Clause ...., It is the inclusion of "other similar
restraint of personal liberty" which allows for conjecture regarding whether
the Court might permit some form of restraint, which does not reach the level
of complete control, to trigger a violation of due process.
The more liberal interpretation appears to be borne out by the Court
indication that Joshua may have been considered in custody had he been
placed in a foster home.4 The DeShaney Court noted that some appellate
courts had determined that liability may attach when the state places a child
in a foster home. 9 Although the Court refused to lend its approbation to
these rulings, these appellate court cases can be construed as demonstrating
parentis.").
41 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (focusing on both Eighth
Amendment and procedural due process issues as related to corporal punishment).
"Supra notes 28-40 and accompaiying text.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989) (emphasis added).
" Id. at 201 n.9. "Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed
Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we
might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give
rise to an affirmative duty to protect." Id.
49 Id.
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another sort of control that might create custody. ° Thus, the DeShaney
Court seemed to acknowledge that at least one situation exists in which
incomplete custody would still give rise to the duty. Consequently, although
by no means a definitive answer for the school environment,5' the DeShaney
decision does provide some guidance and support for the proposition that
something short of an Estelle-Youngberg situation can suffice to create
custody.
Moreover, certain language- in the DeShaney decision indicates that
liability could attach when the state somehow creates the danger which
injures the person52 The Court indicated that the state, by affimatively
creating a danger, would likely have a corresponding duty to protect a person
from that danger.53 If the state had somehow created or exacerbated the
danger that Joshua faced, liability might have attachede
Either through custody or creation of the danger, the U.S. Supreme Court
has left an open window to find control in other areas. Since DeShaney, lower
courts have grappled with determining what circumstances invoke the
constitutional duty to protect children under school supervision. This Note
focuses on one of these areas, namely the classroom environment.5
I.L APPLICATION OF THE DESHANEY RATIONALE IN
DECIDING CASES INVOLVING THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT
Since DeShaney, courts and commentators alike have used custody
or creation of the danger to find a constitutional duty to protect children
' The Court compared an institutionalization or incarceration situation with keeping
Joshua in a foster home. The Court seemed to indicate that a foster home situation might
be enough for custody, although it refused to answer the question. Id.
" A foster home would be very different from a school environment when comparing
instances of control. A foster child/orphan lives in a foster home and consequently spends
most of his or her time under the state's supervision. A student, on the other hand, spends
little time under the school's supervision since he or she is in school only during a small
portion of his or her week. Moreover, whereas an orphan depends entirely on the state for
his or her welfare, a student relies on his or her parents.
n2 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 ("While the State may have been aware of the dangers
that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do
anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.").
"Id.
Id. The court emphasized that although Joshua's situation naturally compels a
person to feel that Joshua and his mother should be compensated for the "grievous harm
inflicted upon them," one must remember, "that the harm was inflicted not by the State
of Wisconsin, but by Joshua's father." Id. at 202-03.
11 Before examining the "sufficient custody" test, it is beneficial to see how courts
have used the analysis in DeShaney to decide this issue.
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in the classroom setting." The logic of the courts generally follows a
basic pattern. First, the court determines whether custody exists, based on
either the amount of "restraint of personal liberty" or a comparison to
a foster home situation." If the court does not find this requisite
custody, the court then determines if the state somehow created the
danger. 9 If either custody or creation of the danger were found, then the
duty to protect would arise and a teacher could be held liable for a
student's injury if the requisite level of culpability was found.'
Using this analysis, one circuit court6 and numerous commenta-
tors favor finding a duty for teachers to protect schoolchildren while
they are at school. Most circuits, however, follow the strict ruling in
DeShaney and determine that teachers do not have enough control over
56 See, e.g., Steven F. Huefler, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After
DeShaney, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1940 (1990).
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; see infra notes 65-143 and 151-73 and accompanying
text.
See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 174-94 and accompanying text.
If the court determines that a duty exists, based on either custody or creation of
the danger, then the conduct of the teacher must be evaluated to see if it was culpable.
The standard applied in these cases is very lenient toward the teacher. Courts judge the
conduct based on whether it rises to the level of "deliberate indifference to an affirmative
duty," Pagano v. Massapequa Public Schools, 714 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1989),
is "grossly negligent," or is "callously indifferent," Lopez v. Houston Independent School
District, 817 F.2d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 1987).
61 The Fifth Circuit is the lone circuit to find such a duty of teachers. See infra notes
107-43 and accompanying text.
' Several commentators have written in favor of imposing a duty on school teachers
or administrators. See, e.g., Karen M. Davis, Note, Reading, Writing, and Sexual
Harassment: Finding a Constitutional Remedy When Schools Fail to Address Peer Abuse,
69 IND. L.J. 1123 (1994); Adam M. Greenfield, Note, Annie Get Your Gun "Cause Help
Ain't Comin": The Need for Constitutional Protection from Peer Abuse in Public Schools,
43 DUKE L.J. 588 (1993); Barbara L. Horwitz, Casenote, The Duty of Schools to Protect
Students from Sexual Harassment: How Much Recovery Will the Law Allow?, 62 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1165 (1994); Susanna M. Kim, Comment, Section 1983 Liability in the Public
Schools After DeShaney: The "Special Relationship" Between School and Student, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1101 (1994); see also Michael Gilbert, Comment, Keeping the Door
Open: A Middle Ground on the Question of Affirmative Duty in the Public Schools, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 471 (1993) (arguing that a constitutional duty should apply only when the
student was actually harassed or injured by a teacher, not a third party). But see Stephen
Faberman, Note, The Lessons of DeShaney: Special Relationships, Schools & the Fifth
Circuit, 35 B.C. L. REV. 97 (1993) (arguing that an affirmative duty to protect students
should not be imposed on teachers).
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the students.' These courts, moreover, would not impose a duty based
on creation of the danger."
A. Decisions Involiwng CustodV
Several circuit court cases' and district court opinions' have
wrestled with whether a teacher has a constitutional duty to protect
schoolchildren. These cases focus most directly on whether a school has
the requisite custody of its students to justify the invocation of this duty.
Those decisions which have concluded that teachers should have no duty
to protect students are handled first.
In Maldonado v. Josey," the Tenth Circuit was faced with a
situation in which a fifth-grade student, who was left unattended in a
cloakroom for approximately twenty minutes, caught his bandanna on a
hook in the wall and died.' The Maldonado court looked at the control
exerted in a school situation and ruled that it did not rise to the level of
custody. The court ruled this way despite two factors which could have
indicated control: 1) the state had truancy laws which compelled
attendance at school,70 and 2) the court had previously ruled that a child
who was placed in a private foster care facility was in custody. The
"See infra notes 68-90 and accompanying text.
', See infira notes 174-88 and accompanying text.
This section includes any decisions that might have been made by cpmparing the
school situation to that of foster care. This comparison, although a different approach, is
still just a determination of how much control is sufficient to create the duty. The only
case that has explicitly explored the issue of comparing the school setting with a foster
care situation is Pagano v. Massapequa Public Schools, 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y.
1989), discussed infra at notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 68-78 and 107-43 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 79-106 and 144-57 and accompanying text. Because numerous
decisions regarding this issue have been made at both the circuit and district court levels,
the author has selectively picked cases to be thoroughly examined in the following
sections. Although several other cases are mentioned in passing, the compilation of the
existing case law is by no means complete.
'4975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993).
Id. at 728. Although the teacher's conduct in this situation did not appear to be
deliberately indifferent, the court did not address this issue. The lack of discussion on this
issue may be because the court did not need to decide this issue since they refused to
impose a duty, or because the court assumed deliberate indifference was found by the
lower court.
7 Id. at 731. The court utilized the reasoning in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area
Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992). See infra notes 73-78.
7 Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 729-30. The court so ruled in Yvonne L. v. New Mexico
Department of Human Services, 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992). But see Pagano v.
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court did not find either of these factors persuasive enough to impose a
duty on teachers.
The court in Maldonado relied heavily on the decision of the Third
Circuit in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School.7
D.R. filed suit along with another student,74 claiming they were sexually
molested at school by their classmates for a period of about six
months.7' The court found no custody, basing its decision primarily
upon the child's intermittent presence at school76 and the fact that D.R.
had lines of communication open outside of the school.' "The state did
nothing to restrict her liberty after school hours and thus did not deny her
meaningful access to sources of help."'
Two district court decisions which similarly refused to find a duty for
school teachers are Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School Districi9 and
B.M.H. v. School Board."0 Both Dorothy J. and B.M.H. provide excel-
lent demonstrations of how courts make the determination of whether the
duty should be imposed.
Dorothy J. closely mirrors the reasoning in DeShaney. In Dorothy J.,
Brian B., the son of Dorothy J., was in a program that taught life and
social skills to the educable mentally handicapped."1 During school
hours on two consecutive days, another student sexually assaulted and
raped Brian B.' The court began its analysis with the proposition that
the Constitution does not normally impose an affirmative duty on the
Massapequa Public Schools, 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), which is discussed infra
notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
72 Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 732-33.
972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 1045 (1993).
4 The other student, L.H., was left out of most of the discussion in the opinion since
she had already reached the age of majority. Therefore, she was not compelled to attend
school.
7S Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1366. This activity occurred in both a unisex bathroom
and a darlcoom attached to the plaintiffs' classroom and included "offensive touching of
their breasts and genitalia, sodomization and forced acts of fellatio." Id.
76 Id. at 1371.
DId. at 1372.
hId.
79 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992), aft'd, 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993). The Eighth
Circuit, in upholding the lower court, agreed with the reasoning of the district court.
Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d at 732. Therefore, because the district court's
reasoning and explanation of the facts are more extensive, this Note continues to cite from
that court's opinion.
so 833 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1993).
81 Dorothy J., 794 F. Supp. at 1407.
2 Id. at 1407.
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state to protect citizens from other citizens.83 However, the Dorothy J
court purported that a teacher might be liable for these harms if a "special
relationship" existed between the teacher and student." This special
relationship could arise through an affirmative action by the state
resultng in either custody or creation of the danger.'
In ruling that custody of schoolchildren did not exist, the Dorothy J
court discounted the theories of "in loco parentis" and truancy laws. Of
"in loco parentis," the court stated that duties under state law could not
reach the level of a constitutional violation. "'A state ought to follow its
law, but to treat a violation of state law as a violation of the Constitution
is to make the federal government the enforcer of state law."'" The
court also discounted the effects of truancy laws, stating, "The parents
still retain primary responsibility for feeding, clothing, sheltering, and
caring for the child."'  In so holding, the court cited to the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Ingraham v. Wright for authority."
The Dorothy J court noted several public policy considerations for
refusing to embrace a broad imposition of liability based on custody. The
court surmised that unlimited liability might ensue since a teacher could
be sued for a skinned knee when the required "state of mind" (complete
indifference or gross negligence) was shown.' In addition, protecting
a student from other students might pose too great a burden on the
teachers. It could force teachers to be "constitutionally obliged to assume
roles similar to policemen or even prison guards in protecting students
from other students.""
In B.MRH, the plaintiff was an eighth-grade female student who was
sexually assaulted by a male classmate, Student H.91 Before the assault
took place, Student H. threatened B.M.H., and B.M.H. reported those
Id. at 1409-10.
Id. at 1411. Compare this with the reasoning of the court in Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp.
56 (D. P.R. 1990), which is discussed infra notes 100-06, 189-92 and accompanying text.
"Dorothy J, 794 F. Supp. at 1411-20.
Id. at 1413 (quoting Arcbie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988)
(en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989)).
" Id. at 1412 (discussing J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267
(7th Cir. 1990)).
" Id. at 1413-14 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669-70 (1973)) (noting
that compulsory education laws are different from incarceration in that school children
have the freedom to return home and lead normal unrestricted lives). See supra note 45
and accompanying text.
S9 Dorothy J, 794 F. Supp. at 1414.
90Id.
9' B.M.H. v. School Bd., 833 F. Supp. 560, 562 (E.D. Va. 1993).
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threats to Linda Singleton, her history teacher.9 Singleton subsequently
relayed the incident between B.M.H. and Student H. to Edward G. Webb,
another teacher at the school93 However, neither of the teachers
punished Student H. or took any measures to protect B.M.H.94 Three
days after B.M.H. reported the threat, Student H. assaulted her on school
grounds.
95
The court began its analysis by reviewing Fourth Circuit opinions
which discussed custody in relation to the DeShaney decision. 6 From
this analysis, the court determined that the only factor relevant to a
determination of the constitutional duty is "whether the state has so
restrained the victim as to prevent him from acting on his own behalf.'
In spite of the fact that the teachers actually knew of the potential danger
to the student, 8 the court ruled that no "special relationship" existed
between the students and the teachers. 9 Therefore, even with the added
element of"foreseeability" of the danger, the court used similar reasoning
to that employed in the Dorothy J opinion to find no constitutional duty.
Arroyo v. Pla"1° is an interesting opinion to compare with B.MH.
and Dorothy J. because of its general disregard for the logic used in those
cases."0' In Arroyo, Eddie M. Roman was accidentally shot and killed
by one of his classmates. 2 Although the court spoke of special rela-
tionships in the opinion, it never decided the issue of custody but instead
based its opinion on the fact that the perpetrator of the crime was not a
state actor."03 The most likely explanation for this ruling is that the
- Id. During history class, the boy said to B.M.H., "I am going to screw you, no
matter what, even if it's in school and even if I have to rape you." Id.
9Id.
" Id.
95Id.
"Id. at 565-70. The court refused to follow an earlier decision's finding of a "special
relationship" in a similar situation. The court distinguished the two cases on the fact that
the earlier decision involved a sexual assault of a student by a teacher, not a third party.
Id. at 566 n.11.
9 Id. at 569.
"See also Graham v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir.
1994) ("We hold foreseeability cannot create an affirmative duty to protect when plaintiff
remains unable to allege a custodial relationship.").
99 B.M.H., 833 F. Supp. at 565.
10 748 F. Supp. 56 (D. P.R. 1990).
... See supra notes 79-99 and accompanying text.
1- Arryo, 748 F. Supp. at 57.
13 Id. at 60. The court stated that "[ja]lthough young children are required by law to
attend school and it may be said that these children are under the custody of the state
while they attend classes, the determining factor in this case is that the death of Eddie
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court ignored the custody issue because no facts indicated that any of the
defendants acted with complete indifference or gross negligence.' °4 The
court did not find that the administrators should have implemented
measures to detect whether students had weapons," 5 nor do the facts
give any indication that the teacher had any way of knowing that the
student was carrying a gun."'
The only circuit court ruling in favor of applying the duty to teachers
comes from the Fifth Circuit. In Doe v. Taylor Independent School
District (Doe 1),07 a student brought an action against the school
district for alleged sexual harassment by her biology teacher."8 Al-
though Doe I did not involve harm inflicted on a student by a third party,
and thus falls outside of the scope of this Note,"c this decision provides
a valuable discussion as to whether a school has custody of its pupils.
The Doe I court relied on its decision in Lopez v. Houston Independent
School District in deciding the custody issue."0
In Lopez, John Lopez was knocked unconscious when a fight broke
out on the school bus on which he was riding."' Lopez alleged that his
school bus driver did not act to break up the fight in time or take the
was caused solely by a private individual" Id. Moreover, the court noted that schools do
not have an affirmative duty to protect students by taking measures to detect weapons
since a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision held that school officials do not have the right
to implement 'jxriodic, random searches" of students. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985)). Thus, by discussing the above two factors, the court sidestepped
the issue of whether a state actor should have a duty to protect an individual from harm
from a third party.
Although the finding of no state action could be construed as negating any creation
of the danger by the school, the custody issue still should be addressed by the court; a
constitutional duty to protect arises when the state either retains enough control to
constitute custody or creates the danger.
'"Although a determination of a lack of gross negligence would preclude any finding
of liability for the teacher, by disregarding any determination of "special relationship,"
the court essentially ignored the logic of the DeShaney decision.
Arroyo, 748 F. Supp. at 60.
"6 Id at 58.
'07 975 F.2d 137 (1992), vacated, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
" Id. at 139. Coach Lynn Stroud had ahistory of flirting with the girls at school and
of showing overt favoritism to certain girls in his class. Regarding Jane Doe, whom
Stroud met when Doe was a freshman, the court stated, "Coach Stroud became enamored
with her to the point of obsession." Id. Although advised repeatedly of Stroud's behavior,
school officials allowed his romantic involvement with Doe to continue for over a year.
Id at 139-41.
' See supra note 4.
1.0 Doe I, 975 F.2d at 144 & n.6 (referring to Lopez, 817 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1987)).
... Lopez, 817 F.2d at 352.
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affirmative steps necessary to get Lopez medical treatment after realizing
that he had been knocked unconscious.1 2 Although the court did not
undertake an in-depth analysis of the custody issue, it stated that the
school bus driver "was entrusted with the care of students attending
school under Texas' compulsory education statute."" 3 Thus, the court
remanded the case back to the trial court for a determination of liability
since the bus driver's "alleged failure to protect John or to render
emergency aid abuses state power, and supports a § 1983 action if the
jury finds it rose to the level of callous indifference and was a cause of
injury.""
4
Based on the holding in Lopez, the court in Doe I, even after
DeShaney, decided that a school should be liable for failing to protect
students while at school.' The court noted, "Parents, guardians, and
the children themselves have little choice but to rely on the school
officials for some measure of protection and security while in school and
can reasonably expect that the state will provide a safe school environ-
ment... 6 Thus, "school officials have a constitutional duty to protect
schoolchildren from known or reasonably foreseeable harms occurring
during or in connection with school activities." 7
However, about a year and a half later, Doe I was reheard en banc in
Doe v. Taylor Independent School District (Doe /)."8 In this decision,
the court distanced itself from the finding of a "special relationship"
based on the DeShaney notion of custody. 9 The court limited its
decision to the specific facts of the case; the court only ruled on the issue
of whether a constitutional duty to protect exists when the harm is
perpetrated by a state actor.' Consequently, the court did not discuss
112 Id. at 352-53.
11 Id. at 356.
114 Id.
115 Doe 1, 975 F.2d at 138. Although the court stated, "The precise contours of a
school official's duty, as it pertains to injuries inflicted by someone other than a school
teacher (or other subordinate), is not before us," the court cited its decision in Lopez as
authority for finding that duty. Id. at 148 n.14 (citing Lopez, 817 F.2d at 356).
16 Id. at 147. The court even went so far as to assert that truancy laws might be
deemed unconstitutional if they forced parents to surrender their children without
imposing a corresponding duty on the schools to protect the students. Id.
117 Id. at 144.
8 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
9 Id. at 451. The court stated that the remarks cited by appellants "from the
DeShaney court simply do not address the issues involved in this case." Id. at 451 n.3.
The court expressly eliminated from its decision any reference to liability for the actions
of third parties.
'" Id. "It is incontrovertible that bodily integrity is necessarily violated when a state
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a teacher constitutional duty to protect the student from harm inflicted by a
third party.
12'
Interestingly, Doe IT did not mention the Lopez decision as a means of
imposing a duty where the perpetrator is a third party.'" The court ex-
plained the absence of Lopez' authority in its decision in Leffall v. Dallas
Independent School Distnict," stating, "It is unclear how much of Lopezs
rationale survives DeShaney."'l The Leffall court continued by saying,
'We did not address the question of whether a special relationship exists in
an ordinary public school setting in our en banc decision in Doe v. Taylor
Indep. Sch. Dist. [Doe B]."' Therefore, after the en banc decision in Doe
ff, it appeared that the Filth Circuit status as the lone defender of school-
childrens' rights had disappeared.
However, the issue was resurrected by the court decisions in Leffall and
Walton v. Alexander.'21 In Leffall, the court was presented with a case
where a student had been shot at a high school dance." This case obvious-
ly entailed an injury inflicted by a third person; thus, Leffall squarely
presented the exact issue which the court had explicitly avoided deciding in
Doe ff." In analyzing the duty of a teacher to protect students from harm
by third parties, the court examined the DeShaney holding'" and then
actor sexually abuses a schoolchild and that such misconduct deprives the child of rights
vouchsafed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 451-52 (emphasis added).
" Since the court's opinion in Doe Iwas vacated by this opinion, the court's ruling
in Doe ff effectively eliminated the dicta from Doe I It was this dicta that indicated that
the court would impose a constitutional duty on a teacher to protect a student from harm
from a third party. See supra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
' Although the Doe H court cited the Lopez decision, the court only mentioned
Lopez for its deliberate indifference standard, which the Doe ff court then applied. Doe
H, 15 F.3d at 453.
1,- 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994).
,24 Id. at 527.
w Id. at 528. The court stated further:
[W]e refused even to consider whether a DeShauey special relationship arises
in the public school context because the issue was wholly irrelevant on the facts
of [Doe B]. The special relationship doctrine is properly invoked in cases
involving harms inflicted by third parties, and it is not applicable when it is the
conduct of a state actor that has allegedly infringed a person's constitutional
rights.
Id. at 528-29 (citing Doe ff, 15 F.3d at 451 n.3) (citations omitted).
126 20 F.3d 1350 (5th Cir. 1994).
1 Leffall, 28 F.3d at 523. Dameon Steadham was fatally shot in the head outside of
a school-sponsored dance when several students began to 'Tire handguns randomly and
recklessly into the air." Id.
"2 See rupra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
'29 Leffall, 28 F.3d at 526.
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reviewed the decisions of other circuit courts on this issue." However,
since the student was attending a dance after school, the court was able
to distinguish this case from the cases considered in other circuits.''
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit avoided a decision on the issue of custody
during school hours. Yet, the court did not foreclose the possibility of
imposing that duty if a case on point should arise. As the court explained:
[W]e need not go so far as have some of our sister circuits and
conclude that no special relationship can ever exist between an ordinary
public school district and its students; we conclude only that no such
relationship exists during a school-sponsored dance held outside of the
time during which students are required to attend school for non-
voluntary activities. 13
Therefore, the court implicitly kept alive the idea that compulsory
attendance provides the required custody to impose a constitutional duty
on teachers to protect students from outside harm.
In Walton, the Fifth Circuit found the requisite custody needed to
impose a constitutional duty in a situation involving a special education
school.133 While a student at the Mississippi School for the Deaf
"Walton was sexually assaulted by a fellow student.""l'6 After reporting
this assault to school officials, including the defendant-appellant Dr. Alma
Alexander, the school suspended both Walton and his assailant for three
days. 35 Upon returning to school, Walton once again was assaulted by
the same student because, according to Walton, the school "took
insufficient measures to shield him from the assailant.""36
The court focused on the issue of whether the custody imposed upon
these deaf students by the school was enough to create a constitutional
duty for the superintendent to protect Walton from other students.37 In
1 30Id. at 528-29. The Leffall court noted, "Several of our sister circuits have
concluded that the relationship between school district and student is not a special
relationship within the meaning of DeShaney." Id. (citing cases from the Third, Seventh,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits).
1 Id.
1. Id. at 529. The court concluded that "even though Steadham may have been
compelled to attend school during the day, any special relationship that may have existed
lapsed when compulsory attendance ended." Id.
13 Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1355, reh'g, en banc, granted, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16495 (5th Cir. 1994).
m Id. at 1353.
135 Id.
n6Id.
137 Because Walton went directly to the superintendent for help, the court viewed the
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making this determination, the court ascertained whether the situation at
the School for the Deaf more closely resembled an Estelle-Youngberg
situation," or the situation in Middle Bucks.'3 Evaluating this special
education setting, the Fifth Circuit found that Middle Bucks was not
controlling. "There are several factors that exist in this residential special
education school which distinguish this case from those cases involving
students who attend day classes ... .140 Since Walton's school more
resembled a prison than a regular high school, the court held that 'Walton
falls within a category of persons in custody by means of 'similar
restraints of personal liberty,' thereby establishing the existence of a
'special relationship' between Alexander [the superintendent] and Walton
,,141
While both Leffall and Walton addressed several issues concerned
with a teacher's constitutional duty to protect students from third-party
harm, neither decision directly addressed the everyday situation of
students at school'42 However, the court revealed much by stating in
superintendent as having a direct relationship with the boy, which allowed the court to
determine the issue of a special relationship between the superintendent and her students
as if it were between a teacher and her students.
,' See supra notes 22-41 and accompanying text.
'a' See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
140 Walton, 20 F.3d at 1355. The court used the following factors to conclude that this
residential school situation was more similar to institutionalization than to day schooh (1)
the school was a boarding school with twenty-four hour custody of the student (2) the
student was deaf and lacked the basic communications skills that normal children possess,
(3) the student was obviously not free to leave while he lived at the school, and (4)
economic realities essentially force most Mississippi families with deaf children to send
their children to the school Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir.
1994) (citing Walton, 20 F.3d at 1355).
The use of factors to evaluate a school is indicative of the sufficient custody test
espoused later in this Note. See infra notes 198-247 and accompanying text. In this
situation, though, the Fifth Circuit has only evaluated a few factors and has applied it
only to a residential school for the handicapped. The sufficient custody test, on the other
hand, is broader and could be used to evaluate any public or private school a child might
attend.
141 Walton, 20 F.3d at 1355 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep'tof Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). However, even though the court found a constitutional
duty to protect Walton, it did not find that the superintendent, Alexander, had acted with
the requisite indifference to be held liable for the second assault. "Alexander's actions
may have been ineffective in halting the molestation, but her actions did not reflect that
she was deliberately indifferent." Id. at 1356.
' This issue has, of course, been addressed directly by the courts which have ruled
that a teacher does not have the duty to protect students while they are at school See
supra notes 68-106 and accompanying text.
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Leffall, "[W]e need not... conclude that no special relationship can ever
exist between an ordinary public school district and its students."'
43
Thus, it appears, by reading this opinion in conjunction with the court's
decision in Doe I, that the Fifth Circuit would likely rule that a teacher
has a constitutional duty to protect students from third parties.
Two district courts similarly have imposed a duty upon teachers to
protect school children, albeit in a more direct way. In Pagano v.
Massapequa Public Schools,'" Sean Pagano alleged that he was
verbally and physically attacked by other students while he was in the
fifth and sixth grades. 5 He further alleged that he told school officials
of this abuse, but they did nothing to prevent it.'" The court, relying
on the DeShaney Court's indication'47 and the Second Circuit's decision
that a foster home could constitute a custodial environment,'" opined
that the situation faced by a schoolchild more closely resembles the
situation faced by a foster child than the situation faced by Joshua
DeShaney.14' Thus, the court determined that school is a custodial
environment and that a custodial relationship exists between a teacher and
student." Consequently, constitutional liability attaches.
Similar to Pagano, Waechter v. School District No. 14-030' also
found the requisite custody needed to invoke a constitutional duty to
protect within the school environment. In Waechter, a gym coach forced
Michael Waechter, a fifth-grade special education student, to run sprints
as punishment." As a result of these sprints, Michael died of cardiac
arrhythmia.' The court applied a broad interpretation of De-
Shaney.'" Instead of looking at whether the school had functional
143 Leffall, 28 F.3d at 529.
1- 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
14' Id. at 642.
'4 Id.
' Id. at 643 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep'tof Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989)).
" Id. (discussing Doe v. Now York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
149 Id. at 643.
Id. ('The facts of the present case... appear to be closer to those of Doe than
DeShaney in that the victim and the perpetrator(s) were under the care of the school in
its parens patriae capacity at the time these alleged incidents occumed.").
"' 773 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Mich. 1991). Although this case deals with a teacher's
conduct, it differs from a case involving sexual harassment since the teacher in Waechter
did not intend the harm that flowed from his actions.
2 Id. at 1007.
15 Id.
" A broad interpretation means only that custody can be found outside of the Este/e-
[Vol 83
"SUFFICIENT CUSTODY" TEST
control of the student, the court considered "whether the state actor
exercised control over the individual's 'personal liberty' under color of
state law."'55 The court found that, since the defendant teacher was in
control of Michael and knew of his physical limitations," the standard
of custody was met."
Unlike the majority of courts ruling on this issue, most commentators
favor imposing a constitutional duty on schoolteachers.'" One commen-
tator, Steven Huefier, specifically focuses on the issues of custody and
creation of the danger.5' As he explains:
[B]ecause schools should be considered custodial, even a court that
refuses to impose affirmative constitutional duties except in the presence
of a custodial relationship should hold them liable for reckless or
deliberately indifferent failures to act. But even without categorizing
schools alongside prisons as custodial institutions, a court should be
willing to impose such duties because of the extensive role the school
plays in shaping the environment of the harm.1
6
D
To reach this conclusion, Huefner reasons that the DeShaney decision
should not be read narrowly to allow recovery only when complete
control exists but instead should be read more broadly.'
A broader reading would allow courts to find that school is in fact a
custodial environment." Huefner's argument for custody is based on
not only the truancy laws" and state "in loco parentis" laws,'" but
also the fact that a court's interpretation of custody should not be overly
formalistic. Instead, he argues that a court should be more cognizant of
Youngberg context. See generally Hueflier, supra note 56.
" Waechter, 773 F. Supp. at 1009 n.5.
Waechter was affected by a myriad of problems, including a congenital heart
defect, learning disabilities caused by a childhood case of meningitis, and legs of uneven
length. Because of these limitations, Waechter was under a doctor's orders to refrain from
exerting himself physically or participating in competitive sports. Id. at 1007.
'- Id. at 1009. Although the court found the defendant in this case had a duty, it is
arguable whether it established a broad standard for all teachers.
" See supra note 62. To appreciate the arguments made in favor of strictly enforcing
a duty to protect students while they are at school, see the seminal work of Huefiier,
supra note 56, which is discussed at length herein.
1s9 See Huefiler, supra note 56.
16 Id. at 1972.
' Id. at 1954-65.
" Id. at 1958.
M Id. at 1967.
16 Id. at 1966-67.
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the level of protection on which the victim relied or depended instead of
focusing on any objective view of custody. According to Huefner, the
courts "should be concerned principally with the extent to which the state,
by limiting the victim's freedom or by taking upon itself the responsibility
for some of her care, increases the victim's dependence on state protec-
tion."'65 This dependence would indicate a custodial environment for
all schoolchildren.
Huefner cites several public policy reasons for creating this duty and
for broadly interpreting DeShaney.'" First of all, children might not be
compensated for their injuries if limited to state remedies." Further-
more, even if state remedies are available, Huefner opines that the extra
incentive to avoid federal suits will push schools to become safer
places.'" He also defends placing this extra duty on teachers by
pointing out that teachers must keep a safe environment if children are to
be taught effectively.'69 Moreover, since the standard of complete
indifference is so low, the duties of the teacher will not be raised
significantly above those at common law. 7' In addition, Huefnier
supports his argument by stating that schools can institute extreme
measures of security without opposition, while a government service like
the D.S.S. in DeShaney could be sued for invasion of privacy." '
This discussion of circuit and district court decisions indicates that,
almost without exception, courts use a bright-line test to determine
whether liability will attach."7 Either custody exists in an Estelle-Gamble
'6' Id. at 1957 (emphasis added).
I" Id. at 1969-71.
' Id. at 1970; see also Mawdsley, supra note 19 (discussing sexual abuse of students
by teachers and the difficulty sexually abused students face in bringing forth claims
against those teachers).
' Huefier, supra note 56, at 1971.
' Id. at 1970.
' Id. at 1970-71.
' Id. at 1970; see also supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text. But see New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (holding that school officials only have the
right to implement searches of students when reasonable suspicion exists, i.e., "when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the
student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school").
' The Fifth Circuit, however, appears to deviate from a bright-line analysis. See Walton
v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, rehk, en banc, granted, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 16495 (5th Cir.
1994). The Walton court evaluated the particular factors which make the school environment
custodial, thus, deviating from a bright-line test. However, the Walton court decision dealt with
a residential special education school, so the decision did not indicate whether the court would
deviate from a bright-line test (which provides that either custody exists for all students, or it
does not) when evaluating a public school. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text
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context, or no custody exists at all. However, this result begs the question
of whether a bright-line test of "always custody-always not custody" is
the best answer. This Note submits that it is not.73
B. Decisions Involving Creation of the Danger
Since a finding of a custodial relationship precludes any determina-
tion of the issue of creation of the danger, none of the cases that imposed
the duty had any reason to consider this issue. On the other hand, several
of the cases that refused to impose a constitutional duty based on custody
did consider the issue of creation of the danger. However, none of these
courts found that such a duty was created.74
One commentator suggests that if a court feels compelled to follow
a strict reading of DeShaney and thus find that a custody-based duty
exists only in cases of incarceration or institutionalization, then the court
still can find a duty based on the creation of danger.75 Such an ap-
proach considers the harm to a child at school to be different from the
harm Joshua DeShaney sustained because the school would have created
and controlled the environment in which the injury was sustained. 7
Therefore, under this theory, a court following a strict control analysis
should examine the environment the school has created for the child. If
the school has created a larger risk of danger for the child at school, then
the teacher and school should be liable when the child is injured as a
result of the increased riskY" This position can be demonstrated by
looking at previously discussed cases that have examined this issue. 78
In D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School,' the
plaintiffs raised the claim of state-created danger based on the fact that
a unisex bathroom and a darkroom were attached to the classroom."l
1 See Infra notes 198-247 and accompanying text.
'7 D.R. v. Middle Bucks Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), cert
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993); Dorothy J. v. Lime Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D.
Ark. 1992), aftld, 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993); Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp. 56 (D. PI. 1990).
'"Hufner, supra note 56, at 1968.
176 Id.
7 Id.
'" Remember that each of these courts considered this idea only after deternining
that no custody existed in a school setting. See supra notes 73-90, 100-06 and
accompanying text.
"' 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denled, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
1d. at 1375. The plaintiffs claimed that adjoining rooms created the danger since
most of the attacks occurred there. Plaintiffs also argued that enclosed rooms attached to
the classroom provided a readily available place for attacks to occur. Furthermore, D.R.
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Plaintiffs also asserted that the school increased the risk of harm to the
students by not informing the students' parents of; or investigating and
putting a stop to, the illicit behavior.'' The court ruled that these
transgressions did not rise to the level of creation of the danger since they
could not be seen as a cause of the harm suffered.' However, the
court stated that the case was Very close."
Similarly, the court in Dorothy J v. Little Rock School District"
also considered the idea of creation of the danger. This issue was
especially poignant since the school placed Brian B.'s attacker, Louis C.,
in Brian B.'s class with knowledge that he had violent sexual propensi-
ties. 85 The court approved of attaching liability where the school
created the danger, even in the absence of custody.'86 Like the court in
Middle Bucks, however, this court could not find a direct causal link
between the state's conduct and the attacks on Brian B.; the school had
placed Louis C. in the school program two years before the attack
occurred. Therefore, creation of the danger did not apply, and the
court found no constitutional duty.'"
In the case of Arroyo v. Pla,'" the court skipped the determination
of custody and discussed whether the school created the danger. The
plaintiff argued that, through lack of safety measures, the school had
claimed that the teacher did not allow her to leave the room to use another restroom. Id.
at 1382 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
... Middle Bucs, 972 F.2d at 1373.
1- Id. at 1375 ("Plaintiffs' harm came about solely through the acts ofprivate persons
without the level of intermingling of state conduct with private violence that supported
liability in [other decisions].').
183 Id. at 1374 ("Although we find this to be an extremely close case, and certainly
a tragedy, we are convinced that the school defendants did not create plaintiffs' peril,
increase their risks of harm, or act to render them more vulnerable to the student
defendants' assaults.').
'- 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992), a'd, 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
i.. Id. at 1408.
116 Id. at 1421.
" Id. ("If Louis C.'s attack had come a few weeks or even months after his
placement in the CBI program, the plaintiff might have a stronger case for the existence
of a duty to protect.").
"" This ruling was upheld in Dorothy . v. Little Rock School District, 7 F.3d 729
(8th Cir. 1993). However, it is interesting to note that on appeal, the plaintiffs added
another allegation to their creation-of-the-danger argument. This allegation claimed that
a school employee had placed the two boys in the shower together "to confirm his
suspicions" that Brian B. was being assaulted. Id. at 734. The appellate court noted that
such an occurrence would likely change its interpretation of creation of the danger, but
it refused to consider the allegation since it was not raised at the district court level. Id.
'9 748 F. Supp. 56 (D. P.R. 1990).
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encouraged or created an unsafe environment.' According to the
plaintiff, "By failing to institute adequate security measures, defendants
tacitly approved and encouraged misconduct such as allowing students to
carry weapons to schooL' 9' The court dismissed this argument since
the school actually had a guard on duty and the court feared that
unwarranted searches of the students might violate rulings handed down
by the U.S. Supreme Court."9
From these cases, it is apparent that although creation of the danger
is a viable theory for imposing a constitutional duty, it is not a theory that
courts generally accept. A court's reluctance to accept this argument likely
flows from its determination of custody.'93 Thus, when a court rules
that the requisite custody is not present, a school would have to place a
student in tremendous immediate peril that directly caused harm before
a duty to protect would ever be imposed on the teacher."
C. Conclusions
A majority of the commentators but a minority of the courts have
found a constitutional duty for teachers.' 5 Courts appear to be much
more likely to follow the strict letter of the law as set down by De-
Shaney, regardless of the views of the commentators. These courts
consistently make the determination of duty based on the idea of custody.
No court yet has rejected the finding of custody and instead found
liability on the basis of creation of danger. This view of custody has
resulted in the courts' creation of a bright-line test, where a classroom
environment either always will, or always will not, be considered
custodial.
Although the constitutional line-drawing in this issue is important, the
policy issues should be the determining factor. The competing interests
- Id. at 57. Although the court used somewhat faulty reasoning by not deciding the
issue of custody first, its discussion of creation of the danger is enlightening.
Id. at 60.
Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
It should be noted, however, that several of the courts, which did address and
seemingly accept the creation of the danger theory, did not rule for the plaintiff because
the court could not find the requisite causal connection between the danger and the harm.
See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
04 Arguments that the school is an inherently dangerous environment to which a child
is subjected are not very convincing. Schools are generally only a reflection of society.
In fact, "[t]en percent of the children visiting Boston City Hospital's pediatric clinic last
year had witnessed a shooting or a stabbing before age six." Thomas Toch, Violence in
Schools, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 8, 1993, at 30, 34.
See sn'a notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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are between the teachers, who do not believe they should be subjected to this
extra burden, and parents, who want to be able to entrust the care of their
children to the school Each side is supported by meritorious arguments, and
a person' view is formed by whether they believe the imposition of a duty
will force teachers to be "policemen or prison guards" '19 or will merely
make teachers more cautious." This Note suggests that a bright-line test
is not the best way to choose between these polar opposites and that a
solution that can achieve some of the benefits of each position should be
employed.
IV. "SUFMICIENT CUSTODY" TEST
This Note adopts a view that has only been mentioned in passing 98
and greatly expands on it to create a test for a constitutional duty that will not
be subject to bright-line determinations. This test is the "sufficient custody"
test. Instead of a bright-line test which either imposes liability whenever a
teacher is completely indifferent or never imposes liability at all, this test
considers the particular circumstances of each case. However, the circum-
stances would be based not on the actions of the schools, but rather on the
needs of the student.
The needs of the student would be determined by that studentt mental
capabilities, age, and ability to communicate with adults. These attributes
would indicate how much restraint and control are needed for a particular
student. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in DeShaney, "[W]hen the State
by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individualt liberty that
it renders him unable to care for himselt and at the same time fails to provide
for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by
the... Due Process Clause."99
Unlike the situation faced by a prisoner, the question whether a student
has been restrained to the point that he or she has been rendered unable to
care for himself or herself depends not on the actions of the school and its
"s See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
u" See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1381 (3d
Cir. 1992) (Sloviter, C.L, dissenting) (suggesting that the duty should extend to young
children and those with disabilities), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993); Recent Case,
106 HARV. L. Ry. 1224, 1229 (1993) (suggesting case-by-case review for the imposition
of liability); see also supra note 140.
The ideas contained in these sources provide a basis upon which the proposed test
has been built.
19 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep'tof Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
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personnel but on the ability of the individual studene2° This "sufficient
custody" test represents a position supported by case law and is the best
alternative from a public policy standpoint.
A. Case-law Basis for the "Sufficient Custody" Test
The basis for the entire "sufficient custody" test is an interpretation
of DeShaney and other cases that allows for the use of a range of
custody 0  "DeShaney appeared to establish a continuum by contem-
plating explicitly the possibility that state restraints other than physical
incarceration might foster a constitutional duty."'2 2 This continuum, or
range, runs from complete lack of custody/control on one end, to total
custody/control on the opposite end. Within this range of overall control,
the issue of school custody can be judged on its own separate range.
These ranges can be shown conceptually as follows:
Chart
Constitutional
Duty
I5
1 D 3 5
[. I I- ]
(Range of Custody)
2 4
(Range of School Custody)
20 This difference is because prisoners, no matter what their mental or physical
condition, have no means to care for themselves. Students, on the other hand, do have the
opportunity to care for themselves as long as their mental and physical faculties allow
them to do so. Therefore, the particular restraint imposed on the student is not as
important as is whether the student is in need of restraint.
"' It might seem inconsistent to use the notion of a range of custody since custody
seems to be an all-or-nothing proposition, which provides that custody either exists or
does not. However, this Note's custody continuum practically equates custody with
control See Recent Case, supra note 198, at 1227 (suggesting the notion that the courts
could judge these cases in "degrees of custody").
' Id. at 1227. This article criticizes the logic used to decide the Middle Bucks case,
stating, "The central flaw in the Middle Bucks majority's reasoning lies in the court's
characterization of custody as a bright-line issue of locks and bars." Id.
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In the chart, the line between 1 and 5 represents the continuum of
possibilities for the exertion of custody by state actors. The number 1
represents no custody at all, while 5 represents total custody.2 3 The line
that is marked by 3 shows the division between control that does not rise
to the standard of creating a duty (to the left of line 3), and control that
does create a duty (to the right of line 3) .2 4 The "D" on the Range of
Custody represents where the DeShaney decision would fall 2 s
The line between 2 and 4 represents where the issue of school
custody would lie on the range of overall custody.26 The number 2
represents the lowest amount of custody/control that would be exerted by
a school.2°7 Likewise, point 4 demonstrates the greatest amount of
custody/control applied by a school 2 The space on the Range of
School Custody between the Constitutional Duty line (line 3) and point
4 represents where the duty would be applied in the school setting, and
the space between point 2 and 3 indicates where it would not be applied.
To determine whether the school setting should lie to the right or left
of the Constitutional Duty line, the court must look at the entirety of the
circumstances under which the schoolchild was educated.2' The
entirety of the circumstances under which the child was educated includes
two major factors: 1) the child's mental capacity, age, and ability to
Thus, five would represent the situation of the prisoners in Estelle and of the
involuntarily committed mental patients of Youngberg. See supra notes 22-41 and
accompanying text. Note that the numbers on the chart are used only as reference points
and are not meant to be equal distance apart. See infra note 206.
Thus, line 3 is the 'Constitutional Duty" line.
Since the Supreme Court obviously did not use this test, the DeShaney decision
is approximated on this continuum to give the reader some perspective. The Court found
that some custody was exerted, so it would lie on the line to the right of point 1 (no
custody). However, not enough restraint was applied to create a duty based on custody.
Therefore, it lies to the left of the Constitutional Duty line (line 3).
26 This line for school custody is meant to be overlaid on the overall Range of
Custody line. However, to facilitate the reader's understanding of the diagram, it is printed
below the Range of Custody line. The distance between point 2 and line 3 is greater than
line 3 and point 4 because there would be more school situations where there is not
sufficient custody to create a constitutional duty.
I Since some control is inherent in the classroom setting, the left-most point on the
Range of School Custody is still to the right of point 1 on the Range of Custody
continuum.
2 Once again, the school situation stops short of the extreme shown on the Range
of Custody continuu. Although school might not be the students' favorite place to be,
students are rarely treated as prisoners or confined mental patients.
' Although this approach would likely lead to more litigation since more cases
would be forced to go to trial to be decided, that effect would hopefully be outweighed
by the public policy benefits. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
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communicate and 2) the environment which would reasonably protect that
child.
The child's mental capacity, age, and ability to communicate relate
directly to the amount of control, and therefore the amount of custody,
that a school is going to exert. Chief Judge Sloviter employed this
argument in her dissent in Middle Bucks. 0 "[Tihe duty of state entities
to protect those already within their charge should be broad enough to
extend at least to young children and those who, because of disability or
other impairment are not likely to seek assistance promptly."2 "
However, the peculiar needs of a certain student might not be a valid
basis for implying custody. "The affirmative duty to protect arises not
from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its
expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has
imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf."2 " In Dorothy
J.,2 3 the district court interpreted this statement to mean that custody
can be created only by the actions of the state not by the needs of the
children in the state's care.214 Therefore, it appears that DeShaney bars
imposing liability based on the individual needs of young or handicapped
children. This denial of liability is in direct opposition to Chief Judge
Sloviter's dissent in Middle Bucks.2t5
However, in employing the "sufficient custody" test (and thereby
ascertaining the location of that situation on the Range of School
2'0 972 F.2d 1364, 1377-84 (3d Cir. 1992) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
" Id. at 1381. The theme of this dissent was also argued in Recent Case, mpra note
198, at 1229. The article submitted that "[o]ne possible approach would be to mandate
a case-by-case inquiry that would examine the plaintiff's dependence on state officials for
protection and the causal connection between school officials' breaches of duty and the
harm to the plaintiffs." Id. (footnotes omitted). Although the argument for this dependency
test may not be based entirely on the child's special needs, it does appear to be the main
concern in advocating a duty in the Middle Buckr case. "Middle Bucks held that a
hearing-impaired, helpless teenager abused under her teacher's nose must be subjected to
no less than twenty-four hour lockup before the state owed her any affirmative duty...."
Id.
212 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep'tof Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
2" 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992), aft'd 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
24 Id. at 1414. The court went on to state, "Absent additional limits on the disabled
student's freedom to act other than those routinely part of the school day, the Court cannot
say that an affirmative duty to protect exists based solely on the handicap itself." Id
2" 972 F.2d 1364, 1377-84 (3d Cir. 1992) (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting), cert. deied,
113 S. CL 1045 (1993). The majority in Middle Bucks never addressed this issue. A
choice between the two sides is not necessary to support the basis of this Note; hence, the
Note does not choose a position.
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Custody), the findings of the peculiar needs of the child is not the end
determination, but merely a means to get to that end. The end determina-
tion, under the DeShaney decision, is an evaluation of the limitations on
freedom imposed by the school The particular needs of a certain student
or group of students can lead a court to decide the proper limitations on
the freedom of the student or group of students.
By working backward and assuming a duty exists, the court's final
analysis must focus on whether the teacher's conduct was grossly
negligent or completely indifferent.2 6 To decide this, the court must
have an idea of the reasonable teacher's level of control, so it can
determine if the actual conduct grossly deviated from the norm. However,
a consistent norm cannot be applied to all classroom settings or environ-
ments. Therefore, the norm must be created by determining reasonable
conduct in light of the different factors, of which the primary one is the
age and mental ability of the student.217
In sum, courts must use the age and ability of the child as one factor
to construct a "reasonable" environment. The court must then measure
this reasonable environment, as opposed to the actual environment
involved in the case, to see if it lies to the right of the Constitutional
Duty line (line 3) on the Range of School Custody line.218 If it does,
sufficient control is obtained, and the duty is imposed. When the court
imposes this duty, the factfinder then compares the actual environment to
the reasonable one that has been constructed and determines whether the
actual grossly deviates from the norm.2 9
This approach might be best illustrated with an example. Suppose that
a teacher takes his class of four-year-old students to the playground. This
playground is next to a busy highway. The teacher decides to read a good
book and lets the children run completely wild. Inevitably, one of the
children is struck by a passing car.
If a court began its examination by looking at the restraints imposed
upon the children, then custody in this case would not exist since the
teacher exerted no control whatsoever. However, under the "sufficient
custody" test, the court would test custody not upon the actual situation
as it existed, but upon the situation as it would exist if a reasonable
26 This standard has been applied in cases discussed previously. See supra note 60.
217 Other factors might include prior violence that has taken place at the school, the
violence present in the neighborhood, or the general environment of the city.
21, See chart, supra p. 255.
219 The term "environment' applies to single occurrences as well as to conduct that
happens over a long period of time. The environment of the classroom is as important in
an isolated assault as it is in a series of sexual offenses over a period of time.
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teacher were in control of the class. In determining the actions of a
reasonable teacher in the circumstances, the key factor is the age and
abilities of the children. In this case, sufficient custody exists since a
reasonable teacher overseeing small children near a road would exert a
great deal of control.
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court's statement in DeShaney that an
affirmative duty cannot be created by the needs of the individual "
appears to be somewhat inconsistent. The only way to judge custody is
to look at the limitation placed upon freedom. However, to determine
what the normal limitations on freedom are, the courts must use the
individual's predicament, even though the U.S. Supreme Court said it
should be ignored."
Another factor involved in determining the reasonable environment
is creation of the danger." As opposed to using creation of the danger
as a second approach to impose a duty, it is best used to support the
"sufficient custody" testO' It can be used to determine how much the
actual conduct deviated from the court's assessment of a reasonable
environment. If the school somehow created a dangerous situation,
a greater deviation from the norm has been demonstrated.'
Putting together all the factors discussed above, the "sufficient
custody" test should work quite well on a case-by-case basis. As an
example of how the "sufficient custody" test would work, look again at
' DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep'tof Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989);
see supra note 212 and accompanying text.
" Id. See the arguments contained sipra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
2 For a discussion of this concept, see supra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
22 Even though the courts have considered this concept, no court has actually used
this as an independent reason to impose a duty. Therefore, its best use seems to be as
evidence of control.
' The idea that a child is placed in danger merely by being brought to school is
usurped in the determination of control. Regardless, it would be very difficult to prove
that children are exposed to any greater danger at school than they are in their own
neighborhood or at a party.
v' The situation in Middle Bucks provides a good example of where this analysis
could be employed. See supra notes 179-83 for a discussion of how creation of the danger
was argued in Middle Bucks. In that case, a unisex bathroom and a darkroom were
attached to the classroom. The plaintiffs argued that this arrangement helped to foster an
environment where they could be attacked. Under the "sufficient custody" test, instead
of determining this separately, this factor would be used to determine the deviation from
reasonable behavior in the circumstances. If it would be grossly negligent to have such
an arrangement, that finding indicates that the entire environment in which the incidents
happened might have been handled in a grossly negligent manmer.
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the situation posed in the introduction of this Note36 First, the court
must formulate, based on the particular needs of the students, a reason-
able environment for the schooL In this case, the court would focus on
the environment of the class that Mrs. Smith taught. To determine the
standard of a reasonable environment, the court would focus primarily on
any peculiar needs of the victim, Jeff Jones. 27 Since Jeff apparently
had no need for special control or restraint, the court should rule that
"sufficient custody" does not exist m and therefore the suit against the
teacher would not go to the jury.'
Suppose, however, that the class that Jeff and Stanley occupy is for
severely mentally and emotionally handicapped children. In this instance,
that fact may well suggest a finding of sufficient custody to impose the
duty. In that case, the determination of whether the teacher was liable
would go to the jury.30 To determine liability, the jury would take as a
basis the actions of a reasonable teacher within a reasonable custodial
environment?"t and then compare it with the actual behavior in ques-
tion. If the actual behavior grossly deviated from the reasonable standard,
liability would attach to the teacher.'
In conclusion, then, the following steps should be used by a court to
determine whether a teacher has a constitutional duty to protect children
in a particular school setting. First, the court should develop a reasonable
environment by looking mainly at the particular needs of the students at
risk or the specific student who was harmed. Second, the court should
look at the reasonable environment and control that should have been
employed to see if it is sufficient to create custody such that a duty
inures&3 Third, if the reasonable environment does not limit the
freedom of the students enough to create a duty, then the court should
decide in favor of the teacher. However, if the reasonable environment
does limit freedom enough, then a fourth step should be employed. The
factfinder should compare this reasonable environment with the actual
conduct, including any danger that may have been created by the school
22 See supra p. 229.
2See the five-step process, infra pp. 260-61.
22 See chart, supra p. 255.
See step 3, infra p. 260.
• See steps 4-5, infra pp. 260-61.
" In this case, a reasonable custodial environment refers to how the jury perceives
that a reasonable teacher, in an environment considered custodial, would handle a
situation where she witnessed a gun being kept in a student's locker.
232 See step 5, Infra p. 261.
2 See chart, supra p. 255. This analysis must be employed on a case-by-case basis.
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Fifth, if the actual environment or conduct does not grossly deviate from
the norm or show deliberate indifference, then the factfinder should rule
for the teacher. However, if the factfmder should determine that deliberate
indifference is shown, then liability against the teacher must be imposed.
As illustrated in the example set forth above, this test allows courts the
flexibility to make a determination on an individual basis" while still
retaining enough control over the situation to bring uniformity to the area.
B. Public Policy Reasons for the "Sufficient Custody" Test
Very persuasive arguments exist both for and against imposing a
constitutional duty on teachers. The "sufficient custody" test permits
courts to make decisions for the right reasons without harming the
interests of the teachers.
The first public policy served is relieving some of the responsibility
on our already overworked and underpaid teachers. 5 Their ability to
protect children has become increasingly taxed as the schools become
more dangerous places. It is indicative of the problem that in 1940,
teachers rated chewing gum and running in the halls as some of the top
disciplinary problems. In 1990, myriad concerns, including drug abuse,
robbery, and assault, now top the list of teacher anxieties. 7
This approach allows the courts an opportunity to find the duty to protect in cases
where it is really warranted. The courts generally dislike dismissing these cases. See, e.g.,
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1365 (3d Cir. 1992)
('This appeal presents us with a classic case of constitutional line drawing in a most
excruciating factual context."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993); Dorothy J. v. Little
Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp. 1405, 1423 (E.D. Ark. 1992), afftd, 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir.
1993) ('The court sympathizes with Dorothy J. and her son over the grievous harm they
have suffered.).
23 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
2 6 This fact has been demonstrated in several recent articles. See, e.g., Roll Call of
the Dead, PEOPLE WKLY., June 14, 1993, at 50 (estimating that 31 fatalities occurred in
public elementary and high schools during the 1992-93 school year); Susan Reed,
Reading, Writing and Murder: A Swvey of Death in America's Public Schools Shows
There's No Sanctuary from the Culture of J-iolence, PEOPLE WKLY., June 14, 1993, at 44,
44 (noting that "[o]ne of five high school students carries a weapon to school at least
once a month" and guns are only second "to automobile accidents as the leading cause
of death among young adults"); Toch, supra note 194, at 32 (noting that, according to
Secretary of Education Richard Riley, violence 'has turned many of our classrooms into
war zones").
" Toch, supra note 194, at 34.
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As Judge Wright noted in Dorothy J,' "[W]ith the epidemic of
deadly violence on many school campuses today, teachers would be
constitutionally obliged to assume roles similar to policemen or even
prison guards in protecting students from other students." 9 Although
Judge Wright advocates no liability whatsoever, the "sufficient custody"
test will likewise relieve most teachers of these responsibilities2'
One commentator espouses a view opposite to that of Judge Wright,
saying, "Imposing affirmative duties on the schools will not pose a threat
to the vitality of school systems and administrators. Schools need to
maintain a secure environment in order to achieve their primary purpose,
that of educating their students." ' However, such an affirmative duty
to maintain a secure environment rests on the school systems and
administrators,242 not on teachers. A teacher's job is to teach students,
not protect them. Since a secure environment is a better milieu in which
to teach, the teacher should be able to rely on the preventative measures
employed by the school system.
Although relieving the teacher of this liability might remove one
avenue of recovery for an injured student, it is unlikely to limit recoveries
substantially. Many students already receive large verdicts based on a
school's breach of its duty of care.2 3 Allowing constitutional liability
only when the "sufficient custody" test is met will protect most teachers
2s 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992), aft'd, 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
239 Id. at 1414.
' The test will relieve most teachers of the duty to protect students from other
students, since, in most environments (e.g., public high school), the court will not impose
a constitutional duty on the teacher. The exception to this, of course, will be when the
students have exceptional needs that would reasonably force the teacher to create a
custodial environment. However, these cases will be rare, and these specialized teachers
likely will not be surprised that they have an extra responsibility in caring for these
students.
2A1 Huefner, supra note 56, at 1970. Although he does not specifically mention
teachers, this liability would apply to teachers just as readily as to administrators or
school board members.
' Many schools have protection measures already in place. Thomas Jefferson High
School in New York "boasts some of the most up-to-date educational equipment in the
country,' including several metal detectors and a grieving room that is stocked with
counselors. A Bullet for Teacher: Violence in Schools, ECONOMIST, July 24, 1993, at A26.
'"Three thousand safety officers-comparable with the ninth largest police force in the
U.S.-walk their beats along the corridors of New York City's schools." Reed, supra note
236, at 44.
'4 For example, a third-grade student was awarded $350,000 for a sexual assault.
Edward A. Adams, Court Restores Award to Victim of Assault, 209 N.Y. L.J. 104, 104
(1993).
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in everyday situations 4 but will still impose a duty in situations where
it is required. u5 This approach will allow judges to impose the duty in
situations where restraints on the students' freedom (custody) indicates
that a teacher should be constitutionally liable.
Another benefit of restricting the instances in which the duty would
be imposed is the idea that older children, or children able to care for
themselves, should develop independence. As journalist and sociologist
Donna Gaines noted, "Young people ... are in the peculiar position of
being overprotected by adults, yet alienated from them .... 2"" In
theory, if children were continually able to rely on teachers for complete
protection, they might never learn the skills necessary to survive outside
of school. "[B]y continuing to isolate teens from the responsibilities of
life in the mainstream, adults fail to challenge kids to be powerful and
independent." 7
CONCLUSION
Although courts appear to favor using a bright-line analysis, the
"sufficient custody" test provides courts with a much more flexible frame-
work. The test gives courts the latitude to impose a constitutional duty
only in situations where it seems to be warranted by the amount of
custody. Once the court determines the reasonable amount of custody
used in the circumstances and that the custody in the case at hand
achieves the threshold for applying liability, then the claim can be given
to the jury. The jury can then evaluate the actual conduct against the
reasonable custody in the situation to see if a gross deviation from this
standard occurred.
In this way, only teachers that are in special situations with needy
students will be subjected to the possibility of a § 1983 suit based on a
constitutional duty to protect. These are the teachers that realize they
must exert a great deal of control over their students to be able to teach
effectively. Therefore, holding them liable for their students' well-being
does not greatly change their responsibilities. On the other hand, teachers
24 See smqra note 240.
11 Huefher argues that the duty will give "added incentive for schools to safeguard
their students adequately." Huefner, supra note 56, at 1971. The sufficient custody test
will also perform this fimction, but it will apply only in situations where the extraordinay
needs of the students merit the extra burden of liability.
'" Patricia Pearson, Teenage Mutant Ninja Canadians?, CFIATELAIN, May 1993.
Z47 Id.
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that handle mature students need not stifle those students in the name of
protection.
John W. Walters
